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Abstract
There is overwhelming evidence of reciprocal behavior, driven by inten-
tions. However, the role of consequences is less clear cut. Experimentally
manipulating how ecient trust and reciprocity can be in deterministic
and uncertain environments allows us to study how payo consequences
of trust and trustworthiness aect reciprocity. According to the results
for our modied Investment Game, trustees reward trust more when trust
is more ecient but do not adjust rewards when the eciency of reward-
ing is varied. Furthermore, higher deterministic benets result in higher
levels of reciprocity for all trust levels, whereas an uncertain environment
diminishes reciprocity.
Keywords: trust and reciprocity; consequences; other-regarding preferences;
uncertainty; experiment
JEL classi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1 Introduction
Trust and reciprocity|in the form of trustworthiness|are main constituents of
social capital and have been observed to improve the eciency of economic sys-
tems (Arrow, 1974) and large organizations (La Porta et al., 1997). According
to Coleman (1990), a trust relationship involves at least two parties, a trustor
and a trustee, and is characterized by four main aspects: i) trust opens up new
opportunities for the trustee; ii) when the trustee rewards trust, the trustor is
better o than when not trusting; iii) when the trustor invests in trust, the
trustor's resources are accessible to the trustee at no cost; iv) there is a time
lag between the choices of the trustor and the trustee (sequentiality).
In this paper, we inquire about trust and reciprocity in a novel interaction
setting that deviates from two aspects of Coleman's description. With reference
to aspect i), trust benets the trustee but does not aect her opportunity set. In
this way, we overcome the usual endogenous restrictions imposed on reciprocity.
With reference to aspect iv), we simply ask the trustee to condition her choices
upon choices of the trustor. Strategically, what is crucial in a trust relationship
is who can condition on the other's choices. Moreover, in contrast to previous
experimental studies of trust, we investigate behavior when consequences of
trust and reciprocity are either fully deterministic or governed by chance.
Although trust and reciprocity are distinct, they are closely related as the
inclination of trustees to reciprocate depends on how they perceive the trusting
behavior of the trustor. The standard economic approach does not distinguish
decisions involving trust from decisions under risk (Williamson, 1993). In this
framework, the trustor would invest in trust only when its expected gains are
positive. Trust is thus rationalizable when the likelihood of rewarding is su-
ciently high. However, one has to distinguish the strategic aspect of trust from
mere stochastic risk. Eckel and Wilson (2004) and Houser et al. (2010), for
example, identify no signicant correlation between choices involving risk and
those involving trust. An fMRI study (McCabe et al., 2001) suggests that the
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part of the brain involved when individuals mutually interact with each other
in trust situations diers from the part involved when individuals face a risky
choice task. Additionally, trust is positively inuenced by a neuropeptide called
oxytocin, whereas risk taking is not (Kosfeld et al., 2005).
However, there is evidence that willingness to take risks impacts on trust
behavior in a social setting. Specically, Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) and
Bohnet et al. (2008) suggest that in trust situations involving social interac-
tion, individuals are less willing to take risks relative to equivalent situations
where chance determines the outcome. They experimentally test this hypothe-
sis, which they term betrayal aversion, and robustly support it across dierent
societies and cultures. In particular, when another person rather than nature
determines the outcome, trustors demand a higher risk premium to compensate
for the costs resulting from a breach of trust.
Trust and reciprocity have been investigated in experimental settings adopt-
ing interaction schemes based on a sequential Prisoners' Dilemma. Within the
class of games with richer action spaces, the Investment Game (Berg et al., 1995)
has attracted a great deal of attention and several replications and variations
can be found in the experimental economics literature (for a meta-analysis, see
Johnson and Mislin, 2011)1. In the Investment Game (hereafter IG), the trustor
chooses how much of a xed endowment (usually a sum of money) to send to
the trustee. This \investment in trust" is then multiplied by a positive factor,
usually set equal to three, and forwarded to the trustee who decides how much
of the received amount to send to the trustor.
The standard rational choice prediction for this game is that the trustee
returns nothing to the trustor and that the trustor, anticipating this, does not
send anything in the rst place. Contrary to this prediction, Berg et al. (1995)
nd that trustors send positive amounts, i.e., on average about half of their en-
dowment, and that trustees return on average slightly less than what is invested
1Another form of sequential prisoner's dilemma and a commonly used device to measure
reciprocity is the so-called gift exchange game (Fehr et al., 1998) designed to mimic actual
gift exchange in labor markets.
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by the trustors. Additional studies have replicated this result and a robust nd-
ing in trust experiments is that trustees reciprocate even when this is costly to
them.
Pillutla et al. (2003) observe that both the magnitude and frequency of
reciprocating is higher when trustors take large risks resulting in high benets
for trustees relative to small risks that result in low benets. This nding is
contrary to incremental models of the trust process (e.g., Rempel et al., 1985)
suggesting that trustors should gradually build trust by initially taking small
risks. However, whether the trustees' decision to reciprocate is due to the size
of their benet as opposed to the level of risk taken by trustors is ambiguous.
In experimentally disentangling this confound, Malhotra (2004) nds that trust
is more likely when the risk of trusting is low, whereas it does not depend on
the level of benet accruing to the trustee. Reciprocity on the other hand is
more likely when the accrued benet is high, but does not depend on the level
of risk for the trustor.
Among the IG experiments, the most relevant for our study are those vary-
ing the eciency factor or multiplier. When reciprocity is measured as the
proportion of investment returned to the trustor, a higher multiplier decreases
the overall level of reciprocity (for a review of results, see Johnson and Mislin,
2011). In our modied IG, both amounts, the one sent by the trustor and the
reward of the trustee, are multiplied by eciency factors. We experimentally
manipulate both multipliers along two dimensions: the multipliers can be high
or low and deterministic or probabilistic. In the deterministic condition, mul-
tipliers are known by participants before choosing, while in the probabilistic
condition participants only know that they are high or low, with equal proba-
bility. Varying multipliers captures dierent productivity levels of a given input
and allows us to explore how consequences aect trust and reciprocity behavior.
In our setting, the choice sets of trustors and trustees remain the same across
experimental conditions whereas multipliers dier from one condition to the
other. Our design renders the IG more symmetric since trustors and trustees
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have the same action space and their choice sets are independent.
In our view, such an experimental design can serve two purposes. First, we
examine the robustness of trust and reciprocity. So far, it is not clear from pre-
vious experimental studies whether their qualitative ndings will remain valid
in more complex trust experiments. Our participants make several choices con-
fronting them with competing concerns like aversion to mistrust, eciency seek-
ing and reciprocity inclinations, possibly triggered by preserving a self-image of
trustworthiness. Second, we assess how various motives inuence behavior in
such an experimental setup. In more complex environments, the cognitively
more demanding task might inuence behavior, e.g. by crowding out or weak-
ening other-regarding concerns. When conclusions from trust and reciprocity
experiments are invalidated by complexity, this would certainly question their
robustness and relevance for institutional design and policy.2
Theoretical contributions suggest that both intentions and payo conse-
quences aect pro-social behavior. Rabin (1993), for example, discusses fairness
in normal form games as originating from intentions of others: if intentions of
others are perceived as good (bad), this may trigger a positive (negative) re-
action. In this vein, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) develop a reciprocity
model for extensive form games, allowing for information updating by the play-
ers. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) measure fairness in terms of payos and suggest
that the material consequences of actions matter more. Specically, individuals
seem to suer when they are either better or worse o than others in terms of
payo (i.e., inequity aversion). McCabe et al. (2003) compare observed choices
in two simple experimental settings. In the rst, trustees can either choose a fair
or a selsh move after a trust move by the trustor whereas in the second, trustees
have the same options, but the trustor is not given the opportunity to trust the
trustee. Whereas the payo consequences of the trustee's action do not change,
intentions of trustors are accessible to trustees only in the rst setting. McCabe
2In our view, experimentalists should not necessarily shy away from cognitively demanding
tasks but try to check that they are fully comprehended by participants. This is checked by
control questions in our study.
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et al. show that fairness is observed in both settings but is much more frequent
when good intentions can be signaled. Falk and Fischbacher (2006) present a
model of reciprocity which allows us to categorize behavior in our experiment:
the perceived kindness of an action is determined both by intentions underlying
the action and its consequences. Due to reciprocity concerns, higher levels of
perceived kindness are expected to be rewarded more. The model accounts for
many stylized facts observed in a wide range of experimental games.
In our modied IG, the cost of trust is kept constant whereas its payo
consequences change across treatments both in their size (high vs. low eciency
gains) and nature (probabilistic vs. deterministic). Larger transfers to the
trustor or the trustee are expected to trigger stronger reciprocity. We show
that investments with higher deterministic benets for the trustee induce more
reciprocity. When the eciency of trust is probabilistic, the overall levels of
reciprocity are in line with those observed in the low deterministic condition.
Furthermore, most trustees do not condition their level of reciprocity on the
expected consequences of reward. As a result, trust protability is positively
aected by multipliers in the game. However, trustors seem to disregard the
levels of both multipliers, i.e., their own and that applied to amounts sent by
the trustee, and generally fail to grasp fruitful investment chances.
2 Method
2.1 Design
We experimentally investigate trust behavior in modied versions of the Invest-
ment Game (Berg et al., 1995). X (the trustor) chooses an amount x that she
sends to Y (the trustee) from among four possible options: 0, 3, 6, or 9 ECU.3
Before being forwarded to Y , x is multiplied by an eciency factor m. In turn,
Y chooses an amount y that she sends to X from among the same four possible
options: 0, 3, 6, or 9 ECU.
3ECU stands for Experimental Currency Unit used in the experiment.
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To capture the sequential structure of the game, Y can condition on the
choice of X, i.e. Y 's choice of y is a function of x in the sense of y(x). A
strategy of Y assigns amounts y for all possible x choices of X, i.e. for each
possible x which X can send, Y decides on the corresponding amount y that is
sent to X. The amount y sent by Y is multiplied by an eciency factor n prior
to being forwarded to X. The payo of X (X) is X = E   x + ny, whereas
the payo of Y (Y ) is Y = E   y(x) +mx. The initial endowment E = 9 is
given to each participant at the start of each round.
The eciency factor m is experimentally manipulated in a within-subject
fashion: in a deterministic condition, it can be either 4/3 (mLOW ) or 3 (mHIGH);
in a probabilistic condition, it can be 4/3 or 3 with equal likelihood (mLOW=HIGH).
Accordingly, each X participant has to choose an amount to send for mLOW ,
mHIGH and mLOW=HIGH , being aware that each condition has the same like-
lihood to be chosen but not yet knowing which one of the three applies.
Factor n is subjected to the same manipulation, but the variation is per-
formed between subjects. Thus, participants in one session are exposed to a
single value of n chosen as 4/3 (nLOW ), 3 (nHIGH), and 4/3 or 3 with equal
likelihood (nLOW=HIGH). All multipliers take a value greater than one so that
eciency opportunities can be exploited. While preserving the general features
of the IG, our design allows trust and reward to promote eciency.
Given our experimental design, X has to choose one of the four possible val-
ues of x for each realization ofm, deterministic with 4/3 and 3, and probabilistic.
Thus, in each round, X is asked to report three distinct choices, knowing that
only one of them is actually going to be implemented. Y chooses one of the four
possible values of y for each m and for each possible amount sent by X for the
given m. It follows that in each round, Y is asked to report 4 3 = 12 distinct
choices of which, eventually, only one is implemented.4
After each round both participants are reminded of the multipliers m and n,
respectively, and informed about their random realizations when the multipliers
4For details on how choices were collected, see the instructions reported in Appendix A.
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are stochastic. Additionally, they are informed about their own as well as the
other's actual choice and about their payo.
2.2 Behavioral Predictions
The experimental design allows us to test alternative hypotheses about the de-
terminants of reciprocity. Under the standard assumption of selsh rationality,
both x and y should be zero across conditions. Similar to the standard IG, Y
does not have an incentive to send back a positive amount to X, irrespective
of the amount sent by the latter. Accordingly, an opportunistic X would send
nothing to Y . However, when individuals value the social consequences of their
actions, outcomes may emerge that deviate from behavior based on common
opportunism.5
Previous studies have highlighted the role of trust and reciprocity in inter-
action settings similar to the one investigated here (for a survey, see Camerer,
2003). A reciprocity-minded Y is likely to send to the corresponding X an
amount y which is increasing with x. An X anticipating such conditioning may
thus trust Y and send a positive amount x. Our analysis focuses on reciprocity
and, thus, on Y 's behavior.
To obtain some testable qualitative predictions, we employ the Falk and
Fischbacher (2006) model. An econometric test of a modied version of the
model will be presented in Section 3.3. In Falk and Fischbacher's model, the
utility UY of a trustee Y is given by UY = Y + Y
P
'X()Y (). The factor
'X is the kindness term measuring Y 's perception of the action by X. In our
setting, 'X captures payo consequences of X's actions, with 'X > 0 denoting
a kind action of X and 'X < 0 denoting an unkind action, in terms of payo
accruing to Y .6 An action is deemed kind if it increases the payo of the other
5What this requires in our setting is that X and Y only care for their own payo and that
X knows that Y is opportunistic in this sense.
6In the original model of Falk and Fischbacher (2006), 'X accounts also for intentions of
X. In our interaction setting, the intention factor as dened by Falk and Fischbacher (2006)
does not play a relevant role because when X chooses to send a positive amount to Y , then
Y can clearly infer the intentional kindness of X's choice. In such a situation, the intention
factor of X is at its maximum level and does not interfere with distributional considerations.
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with respect to a reference standard. We assume the reference standard to
be given by the initial endowment. Thus, any positive investment by X is a
kind action towards Y . The second component of the Falk and Fischbacher
model is the reciprocation term Y , capturing how Y responds to the perceived
kindness of X's action. When an action is perceived as unkind, Y reciprocates
with a negative Y by negatively aecting the payo of X. The opposite holds
when X's actions are perceived as kind. The reciprocal response to X's actions
generates an extra source of utility, added to the monetary payos, that is
mediated by a reciprocity factor Y .
The model provides some qualitative predictions about the impact of the
controlled variation of the eciency factors m and n on the behavior of Y . For
a given x, a higher m increases the perceived kindness of X, due to the higher
monetary benets accruing to Y . This, in turn, will induce a kinder reaction
on the part of Y . The kindness of Y 's reaction is measured by the monetary
benets for X. In this respect, dierent levels of n are likely to aect the size of
the reaction. To achieve the same monetary benets for X, a higher y is needed
for a smaller n relative to a higher n. Accordingly, higher levels of y should be
observed for higher levels of m and lower levels of n. We therefore expect to
observe the highest levels of y in the mHIGH ,nLOW treatment and the lowest
levels of y in the mLOW ,nHIGH treatment.
In the econometric specication of Section 3.3, we modify the original Falk
and Fischbacher (2006) model and assume allocational concerns to be captured
by the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999).7 The intuition for
this is that a positive amount sent by X creates an advantageous allocation for
Y , who kindly reacts to the well perceived action of X by reducing the gap
between their payos. In Section 3.3, we capture reciprocity concerns among Y
participants by estimating a parameter of sensitivity to advantageous dierences
in payos.
7We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that in our symmetric setting the
outcome-oriented model of Fehr and Schmidt may predict reciprocity.
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2.3 Participants and Procedure
The experiment was run in Jena (Germany) using the laboratory of the Max
Planck Institute of Economics. Participants, students of the Friedrich Schiller
University Jena, were recruited using the ORSEE system (Greiner, 2004). The
computerized experiment was programmed and conducted using the z-Tree soft-
ware (Fischbacher, 2007). A total of 184 participants took part in six experi-
mental sessions, and had a median age of 23 years (lower quartile = 21, upper
quartile = 25).8 The gender composition was quite balanced with 43.5 % of the
participants being male.
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were randomly assigned to cu-
bicles preventing interaction with other participants. Each participant received
written instructions and was given a few minutes to read them privately. Then
a member of the experimental sta read aloud the instructions and participants
were oered a chance to privately ask clarifying questions. Before the start
of the experiment, participants had to answer some control questions checking
their understanding of the instructions.
The experiment consisted of four rounds. At the beginning of the experi-
ment, participants were randomly assigned to either role X or Y and kept their
assigned role for the remainder of the experiment. In each round, an X partic-
ipant was randomly matched with a Y participant and participants were made
aware that they would not be matched with the same partner in subsequent
rounds.
At the end of the experiment, one of the four rounds was randomly selected
for payment, with the intent of focusing participants on the game at hand rather
than on a holistic plan for the entire experiment. Experimental Currency Units
(ECU) were used during the experiment and participants were aware of the
exchange rate of 2 ECU= e1 from the beginning. Final payment, including
experimental earnings and the show-up fee of e2.50, was paid in private to each
8In total, we conducted ve sessions with 32 participants and one session with 24 partici-
pants.
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participant prior to leaving the laboratory.9 The payments are in line with
average payments disbursed at the laboratory of the Max Plank Institute of
Economics.
3 Results
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
3.1.1 Choices of X
Figure 1 describes the distribution of individual-level average x choices over the
four experimental rounds, for each n and m.
[Figure 1 about here]
Most of the average choices of X are within the interval 3{6, with slightly
higher values observed in conditions nLOW=HIGH and nHIGH in comparison
to condition nLOW . However, a series of Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests does not
highlight a statistically signicant impact of the multipliers m and n on choices
of X. In summary, X participants do not fully trust their partners and do not
condition their behavior on m and n parameters.
Result 1 Overall X participants reveal intermediate trust levels and are not
responsive to possible consequences of own or Y 's actions, as captured by mul-
tipliers m and n.
Thus, like nancial investors, trustors mostly engage in portfolio diversica-
tion by keeping part of their monetary endowment as a risk-free asset but also
invest in risky trust. Here, this risk is only strategic in the case of deterministic
multipliers and, additionally, stochastic when multipliers are probabilistic.
9On average, participants earned e8.797. Earnings were, on average, higher for Y partici-
pants (e9.774) than for X participants (e7.819).
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3.1.2 Choices of Y
For each n and m, Figure 2 provides a summary description of the distribution
of individual-level average choices of Y conditional on potential choices of X.
[Figure 2 about here]
From Figure 2, we observe that Y participants condition upon the choice
of their respective partners for each level of m and n. However, average and
median values show that the reactions of Y participants do not perfectly match
the choices of their X partners. When comparing choices across alternative
levels of n, it emerges that Y participants reward intentions of trustors and do
not strictly link their actions to the consequences of trust. Given n, average y
is always bigger for x = 9 and mLOW than for x = 6 and mHIGH , even though
the latter generates more positive consequences for Y (12 vs 18, respectively).
Result 2 Higher levels of trust trigger higher rewards for all levels of the mul-
tipliers m and n.
Whether proportional reciprocity, when correctly anticipated by X, renders
trust a protable investment depends, of course, on the proportionality factor
of the reaction but also on the multiplier n. The issue of trust protability is
addressed by the regression estimates reported below.
3.2 Regression Analysis
3.2.1 Determinants of Reciprocity
To analyze Y 's reciprocity, we specify a multi-level logistic model. The depen-
dent variable yrecp takes the value one if Y reciprocates, dened as Y sending
back an amount y equal to, or greater than, the amount x sent by X. Otherwise,
yrecp takes the value zero. The model is estimated by the maximum likelihood
procedure implemented in GLLAMM.10 The main advantage of GLLAMM is
10The acronym GLLAMM stands for Generalized Linear Latent and Mixed Models. For a
review, see Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2005).
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that it allows for the inclusion of several nested random eects representing
unobserved heterogeneity at dierent levels of a hierarchical data set (Rabe-
Hesketh et al., 2005). In our experiment, both X and Y participants make
repeated choices and are randomly assigned to matching groups at the start of
each round, which is taken into account in our estimation.
The behavioral predictions, discussed in subsection 2.2, predict the highest
level of reciprocity for the combination of mHIGH and nLOW , and the low-
est level of reciprocity for the combination of mLOW and nHIGH . The latter
multiplier combination serves as the base case in our regression analysis.
The explanatory variables include the multipliers ofX (mHIGH andmLOW=HIGH),
the multipliers of Y (nLOW and nLOW=HIGH), and the period variable. The
underlying logistic model thus takes the form:
pi = Pr(yrecpi = 1) = f(0 + 
0Zi) (1)
where,
0Zi=1nLOWi+ 2nLOW=HIGHi+ 3mHIGHi+ 4mLOW=HIGHi + 5Periodi
+ 6x6i + 7x9i .
The regression specication controls for the main eect of multipliers, for
the impact of rounds and for the level of trust displayed by the counterpart.11
Table 1 summarizes the results of the regression estimate.
[Table 1 about here]
The results show that in terms of X's multipliers, mHIGH has a positive
signicant impact on the reciprocity of Y , compared to the baseline. Moreover,
reciprocity is more likely for higher levels of trust displayed by X, as shown by
the estimated coecients of x6 and x9 and by the signicant dierence between
the two (see W-st3). In contrast, mLOW=HIGH has no signicant impact on the
reciprocity of Y . For Y 's multipliers, no signicant impact on reciprocal behav-
11In an exploratory extended regression model, we added the four possible multiplier inter-
actions as regressors. The results did not change substantially.
14
ior is observed, as shown by the insignicant coecients of these multipliers.12
Result 3 By positively reacting to the consequences of trust, Y participants
reciprocate more for higher levels of m and x. However, Y participants do not
react to the consequences of their own rewarding by not adjusting their reaction
to multiplier n, i.e. to the eciency of y.
Probabilistic consequences of trust seem to displace reciprocity concerns,
with reciprocity levels for nLOW=HIGH being not signicantly dierent from
those for nLOW (see W -st1). However, reciprocity levels for mLOW=HIGH are
lower than those for mHIGH (see W -st2).
Result 4 Probabilistic consequences of rewards diminish reciprocity concerns:
for the probabilistic multiplier, reciprocity levels are lower than those observed
for mHIGH and similar to those observed for mLOW .
3.2.2 Protability of Trust
The protability of trust depends on the amount y sent by Y and on the multi-
plier n. When taking into account only the choices of X participants who submit
a strictly positive x, the average (median) return on the investment equals to
9.094 (7.000), with a standard deviation of 6.168. The small average return and
the high risk seem to question the attractiveness of investing for reasonable risk
preferences. The ex-post best reply to the choice prole of the Y population
would have yielded average (median) earnings of 13.450 (11.000), with a stan-
dard deviation of 5.858. Overall, X participants tend to perform signicantly
worse than the optimal benchmark (Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test, p-value< 0:001),
with rates of return from 1% to 49%.
The regression of Table 1 shows that Y participants positively react to higher
amounts x but do not adjust their reactions to the consequences of their own
actions, i.e., to n. To better understand the determinants of the protability
12In an analysis not reported here, we estimated coecients in the regression model (1) for
dierent levels of x, separately. For all x levels, the analysis was qualitatively coherent with
the one reported in Table 1.
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of trust, we estimate a multilevel linear model.13 The dependent variable Rate
of return (%) measures the rate of return of the investment made by X and is
given by
 
ny
x  1
100.14 As independent variables, we include the multipliers of
X (mHIGH and mLOW=HIGH), the multipliers of Y (nLOW and nLOW=HIGH),
the period variable (Period), and two dummy variables controlling for the level
of trust displayed by X (x6 and x9).
Table 2 reports the outcomes of two distinct regressions, one restricted to
strictly positive levels of y and one for all levels of y. Particular emphasis is
given to the former because estimated coecients in the latter are likely to be
biased by the high number of observations clustered at the lower bound of the
distribution. We focus on the estimation restricted to y > 0 since we are mainly
interested in how the explanatory variables impact on how much to reciprocate.
[Table 2 about here]
The analysis restricted to reciprocators (with choices y > 0) shows that
in the baseline condition nHIGH ;mLOW , investments tend to generate high
positive returns, with the amount received back being more than three times the
amount invested. When the positive consequences of the investment are further
improved by mHIGH , the returns on investment are even higher, as captured by
the coecient ofmHIGH . However, protability of trust seems to largely depend
on the multiplier of Y : for nLOW , returns of the investment sharply decline. The
same holds for the probabilistic n, whose negative impact, however, is weaker
than that of nLOW (see W-st1). For mLOW=HIGH no signicant dierence
compared to mLOW is observed, but the impact in terms of protability is
signicantly lower than that of mHIGH (see W-st2).
Result 5 The protability of trust is positively aected by the multiplier m via
13The regression model in Table 1 is estimated by the maximum likelihood procedure im-
plemented in GLLAMM and controls for repeated choices at the individual and the group
level.
14The regression estimate refers only to strictly positive amounts (x > 0). In condition
nLOW=HIGH , the expected value of ny is used to calculate the dependent variable Rate of
return (%).
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an increase in the proportionality of reaction, and by the multiplier n that di-
rectly increases the returns for X participants of each unit sent by Y participants.
Table 2 shows that the protability of an investment decreases with the
amount invested, showing a stronger negative eect for an investment of 9 than
for an investment of 6 (see also W-st3). Thus, Y participants do not reward
more risk borne by X participants with higher returns on the investment. Fur-
thermore, investments become less protable as participants gain experience.
Result 6 The protability of an investment decreases with the amount invested
and with experience.
Finally, it should be noticed that, at least in qualitative terms, ndings of
the regression analysis on the subsample of reciprocators are consistent with
those from the regression analysis for the entire population of trustees.
3.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
As specied in Section 2.2, the Falk and Fischbacher (2006) model pro-
vides some insights into the likely behavior in our experiment. We present here
a parametric estimation of a modied model, in which reciprocity of partici-
pants is driven merely by payo considerations. In particular, Y is assumed
to be concerned about the positive dierence between her payo and that of
X. The concerns of Y regarding this dierence are captured by the coecient
, measuring reciprocity attitudes due to the psychological cost of being better
o than the other (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).15 The utility of Y is given by
UY = Y   Y (Y   X), where Y and X are the monetary payos of Y and
X, respectively.
To obtain an estimate of the parameter , we adopt a maximum likelihood
approach similar to that employed by Goeree and Holt (2000) and Blanco et al.
15In a footnote, Falk and Fischbacher (2006) explicitly mention the Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
model as a potential candidate to capture reciprocity of individuals who are purely outcome
oriented.
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(2011). Individuals are assumed to choose according to a logit rule and the same
utility function is applied to all subjects.16
When pooling data, the estimated  is 0:358.17 However, estimates dier
across alternative parameter congurations. The range of estimated  coe-
cients vary from a low-end point of 0.222, in condition mHIGH ; nHIGH , to a
high-end point of 0.389 in condition mHIGH ; nLOW . In general, for a given m
the highest  is estimated for nLOW and the lowest  for nHIGH .
To gain a further understanding of payo concerns captured by , we also
consider the modied utility function UY = y  

(x+ )(Y   X)

. In this
specication,  measures innate allocational concerns, like  in the previous
specication, and  measures allocational concerns that depend on the degree
of trust displayed by X. A positive  implies that Y experiences a higher psy-
chological cost of inequality for higher levels of trust. This will induce stronger
reciprocal reactions for higher levels of trust.
The estimated  and  coecients are both statistically dierent from zero
and equal to 0:249 and 0:017, respectively. Thus, we conrm that payo con-
siderations are likely to aect reciprocity. However, concerns for advantageous
allocations are not fully exogenously determined, like in the original model of
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), but depend on the other's behavior. Stated simply,
the psychological cost of a trustee who is better o than a trustor increases
when the trustor is more trusting.
Result 7 Y participants are concerned about advantageous payo allocations.
Such concerns are stronger for higher levels of trust displayed by X and weaker
for higher eciency of Y 's own actions.
16According to the logit rule, an individual Y who has N options available chooses k 2
N with likelihood pk = exp(U
k
Y )=
P
j=1::::;N exp(U
j
Y ). Here, UY is given by UY = Y  
Y (Y  X). Unlike Goeree and Holt (2000), we are not primarily concerned in how rational
participants are and thus omit the estimation of the parameter  measuring sensitivity to a
change in utilities.
17Interestingly, the estimated  is quite close to the value of 0.380 reported by Blanco et al.
(2011) in a similar estimation exercise. When performing an individual-level estimation, the
average  is equal to 0.284 and 75% of the participants have a   0:351.
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4 Discussion and Conclusions
Our experimental setting allows us to evaluate how payo consequences aect
trust and reciprocity. Consequences of trust and reciprocity are the amounts
received and depend on the multipliers. Whereas the choice sets of trustors and
trustees remain the same across experimental conditions, multipliers dier from
one condition to the other. By systematically varying the multipliers, i.e., the
eciency of trusting (choice x) and rewarding trust (reaction y = y(x) to x),
we test how reciprocity is aected by payo consequences.
Overall, trustees react to the advantageous allocations created by trustors'
kindness. The strength of the reaction is aected by trust and eciency. The
impact of eciency is, however, one-sided: trustees reward trust more when m
is high rendering trust highly protable for them but do not condition their
reciprocity on how protable the reward is for their trustor. As a result, the
protability of trust is positively aected by both multipliers. The impact of the
probabilistic multiplier m is the same as that of the low deterministic multiplier
m. A probabilistic multiplier of the trustor's choice seems to dampen reactions
of the trustees disproportionately. Trust protability decreases with the number
of rounds played and, quite surprisingly, with the amount invested. The latter
seems to be anticipated by trustors who generally display intermediate or low
trust levels. At the same time, trustors are quite unresponsive to alternative
levels of m and n and, thus, do not seem to fully anticipate how eciency
parameters inuence trust protability.
In our view, these ndings are surprising and provoking. Although reci-
procity is based partly on consequences and partly on intentions, it is highly
role dependent how these two reciprocity concerns matter. Trustors seem to
consider trust as a valuable investment opportunity but are not strongly af-
fected by its eciency. What trustees mainly match by reciprocating are the
costs of trustors by, on average, reacting proportionally to x. What they do not
try to achieve, however, is to linearly relate the consequences of trust (i.e., mx)
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to the consequences of reciprocity (i.e., ny).
To allow such ndings, we employed a rather complex experimental design,
confronting participants with several choice tasks. Whereas X participants had
to consider dierent m, n constellations, Y participants were aware of the m, n
constellations but did not yet know to which choice x they nally had to react.
This somewhat unusual design was employed to balance the complexity of the
choice task of both roles X and Y . Game theoretically, this does not matter,
but emotionally it may have rendered our experimental scenario a rather \cold"
one (for a discussion of \hot" play and \cold" strategy method, see Brandts and
Charness, 2011).
The discussion of \hot" versus \cold" play so far is mainly restricted to \one
o" experiments. The relevance of this distinction for experienced behavior
is questionable and probably rather minor. In our view, a \cold" environment
provides a convenient rst testbed and, of course, much more informative choice
data. One can later test whether main eects emerging in an environment of
this kind will survive when it gets \hot", where additionally, one should also
explore experience eects. In institutional design one may, for instance, be
less concerned about purely \hot" eects since, by becoming more experienced,
participants might become less emotional.
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A Instructions (Translation from German)
You have been recruited to take part in a computer administered experiment.
You receive a 2.5 Euros show up fee for taking part in the experiment. Please
read the following instructions carefully.
Prior to the experiment, you will have to answer a few questions testing
your comprehension of these instructions. Please note that the instructions are
written in male gender only for convenience, and refer to both genders equally.
Please do not talk and please raise your hand if there are any specic ques-
tions during the experiment. An experimenter will come to assist you. Please
remain silent and switch o your mobile phone. If you violate these rules we
will have to exclude you from the experiment and all payments.
You will be either a Participant X or a Participant Y. Participants will be
randomly assigned to role X or to role Y and will keep that role for the rest of
the experiment. The experiment extends over 4 rounds. New pairs of X and
Y participants are randomly formed before each round. Each participant X
will not be paired with the same participant Y more than once in the 4 rounds
of the experiment. Participants will not be informed by us, during or after
the experiment, whom they are matched with. In each round the participants
with a given role face the same decision task. However, the decision tasks of
Participants X and Y dier as will be detailed below.
During the experiment you are going to make your choices by using exper-
imental currency units (ECU). All participants are given an initial endowment
of 9 ECU. At the end of the experiment, ECU will be converted into Euros at
an exchange rate of 2 ECU = 1 Euro. As an example, if you have 16 ECU, this
is equivalent to 8 Euros. Only one of the four rounds is randomly drawn for
payment at the end of the experiment.
The decisions that you make during the experiment will aect your nal
payo.
Interaction Structure
PARTICIPANT X
Participant X chooses how much to send to Participant Y. Participant X can
send only one of the following amounts: 0, 3, 6, 9 ECU.
The amount that Participant X sends to Participant Y will then be multi-
plied by a multiplier m. The multiplier m is either 4/3 or 3 or \?". In case of
m=?, the multiplier m is either 4/3 or 3 with equal likelihood.
The following table shows the ECU received by Participant Y for each
amount of ECU sent by Participant X and for each value of m. In case of
m=?, both payos of Y are equally probable.
ECU Y receives
m=4/3 m=3 m=?
0 0 0 0
X sends 3 4 9 4 or 9
6 8 18 8 or 18
9 12 27 12 or 27
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PARTICIPANT Y
Participant Y can react to what Participant X has sent her/him and chooses
how much to send to Participant X. Participant Y can send only the following
amounts: 0, 3, 6, 9 ECU.
The amount that Participant Y sends to Participant X will then be multi-
plied by a multiplier n. The multiplier n is 3 (4/3; ?, which means that the
multiplier m is either 4/3 or 3 with equal likelihood). [Only the multiplier
relevant for the implemented treatment is shown to participants].
The following table shows the ECU received by Participant X for each
amount of ECU sent by Participant.
ECU X receives
n=4/3 n=3 n=?
0 0 0 0
Y sends 3 4 9 4 or 9
6 8 18 8 or 18
9 12 27 12 or 27
[Only the column relevant for the implemented treatment is shown
to participants]
Decision Tasks
PARTICIPANT X
Participant X will be asked to report the amount he/she intends to send to
Participant Y by lling up some tables similar to the one in Figure 1. The
amount sent can be equal to 0, 3, 6, or 9 ECU
Participant X has to decide before knowing the actual value of her/his mul-
tiplier m. This implies that for each possible value of m, he/she has to submit
a choice. The choices are submitted on three distinct screens that dier only
for the value of m.
25
[reproduction of the screenshot of condition n=3 and m=3]
Figure 1: Participant X's screen
Figure 1 refers to m=3, however similar decisions have to be made by X for
the other possible m values, m=4/3 and m=?.
Note that Participant X must choose without being able to condition on
the choice y by Participant Y whereas Participant Y can react dierently to
dierent decisions x by Participant X.
PARTICIPANT Y
Participant Y will be asked to report the amount he/she intends to send to
Participant X by lling up some tables similar to the one in Figure 2. The
amount sent can be equal to 0, 3, 6, or 9 ECU
Participant Y has to decide before knowing the actual choice of the other,
and the actual value of the multiplierm of the other. This implies that for each
possible m, he/she has to submit four choices, one for each potential choice of
the other. The choices are submitted on three distinct screens that dier only
for the value of m.
[reproduction of the screenshot of condition n=3 and m=3]
Figure 2: Participant Y's screen
Figure 2 refers to m=3, however similar decision tables have to be lled out
for the other possible m values, m=4/3 and m=?.
Round Payos
Once Participants X and Participants Y have made their choices, payos in the
round are computed.
The payo of Participant X is dened by subtracting from the initial endow-
ment of 9 Euros the amount x sent to Participant Y and by adding the amount
y received from Participant Y multiplied by the multiplier n (ny). Thus, the
payo of Participant X is equal to 9-x+ny ECU.
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The payo of Participant Y is dened by subtracting from the initial endow-
ment of 9 Euros the amount y sent to Participant X and by adding the amount
x received from Participant X multiplied by the multiplier m (mx).Thus, the
payo of Participant X is equal to 9-y+mx ECU.
In more details, the following procedure denes the round payos
 The multiplier m is randomly chosen for each pair of participants
 The choices made for the chosen multiplier m are employed to compute
the payos of the participants as specied above.
At the end of each round, both participants are informed about the randomly
drawn multiplierm, about the choices made by the other participant, and about
their own payo.
Final Payments
The experiment is composed of 4 independent rounds, but only one of the four
rounds is randomly chosen for payment. The payo in the randomly drawn
round is going to dene the nal payment in the experiment. The amount of
ECU obtained in the round are exchanged with Euros at the conversion rate of
2 ECU = 1 Euro. As an example, if in the randomly drawn round the payo is
of 9 ECU, the nal payment in the experiment is equal to 4.5 Euros (obtained
as 9/2). The show-up fee of 2.5 Euros and the nal payment in the experiment
will be paid out privately in cash at the end of the experiment.
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B Figures
Figure 1: Choices of X Participants (average at the individual level)
nLOW nLOW HIGH nHIGH
m
L O
W
A v
e
r a
g e
 X
0
2
4
6
8
3.05
0
2
4
6
8
4.1
0
2
4
6
8
4.22
m
L O
W
H
I G
H
A v
e
r a
g e
 X
0
2
4
6
8
3.13
0
2
4
6
8
3.87
0
2
4
6
8
4.2
m
H
I G
H
A v
e
r a
g e
 X
0
2
4
6
8
3.38
0
2
4
6
8
4.27
0
2
4
6
8
4.2
Figures within diagrams represent mean values.
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Figure 2: Choices of Y Participants (average at the individual level)
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C Tables
Table 1: Determinants of Reciprocity (GLLAMM: logistic)
Reciprocity Coe (Std. Err.)
(Intercept) 1.816 (0.436)
nLOW 0.622 (0.606)
nLOW=HIGH 0.044 (0.592)
mHIGH 0.537 (0.105)

mLOW=HIGH 0.000 (0.104)
x6 -3.071 (0.125)

x9 -3.749 (0.142)

Period -0.209 (0.038)
W -st1 0.90
W -st2 26.21
W -st3 24.24
Log likelihood -1854.6
No. of level 1 (2) [3] units: 4416 (92) [24]
Level 2 random eects variance} 3.338 (0.649)
Level 3 random eects variance}} 0.513 (0.439)
W -st1 : Wald statistic for the hypothesis that nLOW= nLOW=HIGH
W -st2 : Wald statistic for the hypothesis that mHIGH= mLOW=HIGH
W -st3 : Wald statistic for the hypothesis that x6= x9}subjects; }}matching groups
(0:001); (0:01); (0:05); (0:1); signicance level
Table 2: Protability of Trust (GLLAMM: linear)
Coe (Std. Err.)
Rate of return (%) Reciprocators (y > 0) All (y  0)
(Intercept) 226.622 (18.952) 102.500 (22.417)
nLOW -146.437 (21.709)
 -68.921 (27.739)
nLOW=HIGH -65.454 (21.649)
 -61.994 (27.390)
mHIGH 31.647 (9.452)
 25.885 (9.663)
mLOW=HIGH 9.839 (9.618) -0.372 (9.729)
x6 -93.230 (11.025)
 -27.194 (10.298)
x9 -125.670 (15.773)
 -26.955 (13.461)
Period -9.712 (3.656) -23.001 (3.644)
W -st1 12.85 0.06
W -st2 5.18 7.45(0:01)
W -st3 4.72 0.00
Log likelihood -2615.8 -5028.5
No. of level 1 (2) [3] units: 443 (78) [24] 812 (89) [24]
Level 2 random eects variance} 2106.9 1334.0
Level 3 random eects variance}} 729.8 2263.4
W -st1 : Wald statistic for the hypothesis that nLOW= nLOW=HIGH
W -st2 : Wald statistic for the hypothesis that mHIGH= mLOW=HIGH
W -st3 : Wald statistic for the hypothesis that x6= x9}subjects; }}matching groups
(0:001); (0:01); (0:05); (0:1); signicance level
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